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Introduction
Chilean fisheries have been one of the most dynamic economic sectors in the coun-
try in the last two decades and are the third in national exports, representing ap-
proximately 12% of total Chilean exports in value in 1996 (Central Bank of Chile
1998). In 1997, Chilean fisheries exports reached a total value of US$1.9 billion
and, of this, harvest fisheries accounted for 61%, with US$1.1 billion. Aquaculture
(mostly salmon) made up the remaining 39%, at US$730 million (Chilean
Undersecretary of Fisheries 1997).
Several questions have been raised recently with respect to the present draw-
back mechanisms that exist in Chile. In particular, questions have arisen regarding
the Chilean salmon industry and the potential subsidiary role played by the simpli-
fied tax drawback mechanism and its possible effect on fair market competition. The
purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the drawback mechanisms in Chile play
a relevant subsidiary role in the Chilean salmon industry, with special emphasis
placed on the mechanisms related to the value-added tax (VAT).
The analysis is brought into context through a synthesized review of the origin
of and government justification for creating the different mechanisms for indirect
tax recovery from exports, and a simple analytical discussion on the theoretical con-
ditions under which each mechanism may be seen as an export subsidy. A quantita-
tive analysis of the probable effects of indirect tax recovery mechanisms on the
industry’s economic outcomes, based upon a calculation of total industry tax recov-
ery, is presented. The quantitative analysis is centered on the salmon industry in the
Xth region of Chile (figure 1). This region represents approximately 85% of Chilean
salmon and trout production. The period covered is 1990 through 1996, the
industry’s greatest growth period and a time for which the most significant official
data on quantity and quality is available. This was also the period when the most im-
portant legal modifications of the drawback mechanisms were implemented, and one
in which a persistent decrease in real exchange rates was realized. Finally, it is dis-
cussed whether existing drawback mechanisms may be considered a subsidy to the
Chilean salmon industry.
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Value-added Tax and the Origin and Need for Drawback Mechanisms
Related to Export Activities
Value-added tax (VAT) is an indirect tax imposed on the sale of goods and services
and is the main source of income for the Chilean Government. Producers and/or
traders collect VAT along the production and marketing channels. Producers and/or
traders purchasing capital or intermediate goods and services, at a price including
VAT, acquire a tax credit equivalent to the extra money paid (purchase value multi-
plied by the tax rate). Producers and/or traders selling final goods or services, at a
final price also including VAT, acquire a tax debit equivalent to the extra money re-
ceived (sales value times the tax rate).
When it comes to paying tax, each producer and/or trader must declare both
credits and debits previously acquired and reimburse the difference to the state. That
Figure 1. The Tenth (Xth) Region of Chile
source: Microsoft mapThalassorama 295
is, producers/traders act as simple tax collectors, transferring the higher price origi-
nated by this tax to the final consumer.
When levied goods or services are consumed abroad, it is not possible for the
exporter to collect this tax. The need to avoid the export of national indirect taxes,
and, thus, avoid double tax payment by recovering them in the country of origin, has
been signaled in international trade agreements. Chilean legislation provides for al-
ternative mechanisms that allow exporters to recover the indirect tax paid for inputs
used in producing export commodities. These mechanisms are classified as general
drawback mechanisms and special drawback mechanisms. The Chilean government
also considers special drawback mechanisms as a means of reducing transaction
costs and as incentives for export growth and diversification.
General Drawback Mechanism Related to the Value-added Tax
The general VAT reimbursement mechanism (GTR) related to export activities, as
defined in Decree Law No. 825 of 1976, Article No. 36, gives exporters the right to
recover the tax levied while purchasing goods or acquiring services in national mar-
kets or while importing goods required for their business. Taxed goods and services
eligible for a tax reimbursement include fixed assets and inputs required by the ex-
port activity. Tax reimbursement, as such, may be used to pay any state tax debt, as
long as the exporter owes the state tax money, except in the case of deferred import
right payments.
There is also a legal mechanism for avoiding tax payment on required imported
raw materials (Article 12 of DL No. 825), via a formal authorization for a tax ex-
emption from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service. Nonetheless, transaction costs
involved in obtaining this authorization are high (e.g., exporters may apply for this
exemption only if they have separate accounting systems and are willing to be sub-
ject to periodic scrutiny by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service), making this
mechanism an exception rather than a rule.
Special Drawback Mechanisms
Two special mechanisms for export tax reimbursement were created during the
1980s, with the explicit purpose of reducing transaction costs to exporters and creat-
ing incentives for export growth and diversification. This action was directed at
small- and medium-sized firms specifically as a way to reduce the impact of the bal-
ance of payments crisis which existed in Chile during the early 1980s. The first spe-
cial drawback mechanism (Law No. 18,480 of 1985), is known as simplified tax re-
imbursement (STR) [Reintegro Simplificado de Gravámenes], and the second (Law
No. 18,708 of 1988), is known as customs tax reimbursement (CTR) [Reintegro de
Gravámenes Aduaneros] (Ministry of Economics 1985–96).
Simplified Tax Reimbursement
The STR was enacted as an incentive to emerging and nontraditional export growth,
which is an important component of the Export Promotion Policy of the Chilean
government. The STR is aimed at facilitating access to international markets to
small- and medium-sized firms by reducing the costs of creating and maintaining anLetelier and González 296
appropriate accounting system, securing the necessary working capital, and offering
assistance with the paperwork necessary to obtain drawbacks.
The STR originally secured reimbursement of 10% of the total free-on-board
(FOB) value of national, nontraditional goods exported with an average value (by
customs category, as classified at acceptance time of export declaration), of less
than or equal to US$2.5 million in 1983 and 1984.1
In 1986, in order to secure the “nontraditional export” nature of commodities
eligible for the STR mechanism, the Chilean Ministry of Economy posted a first list
of products excluded from STR benefits. This list was renewed annually until 1990,
with commodities whose export value (in real terms) was greater than FOB US$7.5
million in the previous calendar year. Also included were export commodities with
capital and/or input import value (in real terms) higher than US$7.5 million (CIF).
In 1987, a step-wise system for STR was introduced (Law No. 18,653), allow-
ing exporters to obtain different percentage levels for tax reimbursement. This step-
wise system was upgraded in 1991 (Law No. 19,024) and in 1993 (Law No. 19,270).
The objective of these changes was to fit the STR mechanism to the real expansion
path and level of Chilean exports, including the salmon industry, as well as to im-
prove the economic instrument. Table 1 shows the tax reimbursement levels and eli-
gibility conditions.
The positive aspect of the STR mechanism is the simplicity of the required pa-
perwork procedure. In fact, to apply for STR an exporter must present only an ex-
port declaration processed by the Chilean Customs Service and a notarized declara-
tion of the exported value. On the other hand, the most important criticism of STR is
that the total reimbursement amount is calculated from FOB export value and not
from actual tax paid in producing the export commodities, possibly implying an
over-reimbursement and a positive net difference in favor of exporters.
Customs Tax Reimbursement
The customs tax reimbursement (CTR) mechanism was established as part of a
stronger implementation of the Chilean Government’s Export Promotion Policy. The
main objective of CTR is the reimbursement of VAT and import tariffs paid by ex-
porters when importing (directly or via third parties) raw materials, intermediate
goods, and parts to be used (with transformation) in the production of an export
commodity.
The CTR differs from the STR in that it excludes all imported services, fuels,
and any other energy resources, when their main use is to generate heat or energy
required in producing an export commodity or service. The advantage of the CTR
mechanism is that there is no limit on imported inputs as a percentage of FOB ex-
port value in order to be eligible for this reimbursement mechanism.
To apply for CTR, an exporter has to present a completed application form and
an import declaration in order to request a certificate from the Customs Service.
This certificate, if granted, will establish the reimbursement amount in US$ calcu-
lated from the proportion of inputs used in producing the export commodity.
1 FOB value does not include any costs or disbursement deductible by the export firm, and is calculated
(in U.S. dollars) according to the exchange rate established in Article No. 122 of Chilean Customs Ordi-
nance. National export goods are defined as those produced entirely in the country with national inputs
or using imported raw materials, intermediate goods, or parts with a total cost of insurance and freight
(CIF) value equal to or less than 50% of the FOB value of the exported goods. Additionally, imported
raw materials, intermediate goods, or parts must be transformed during the production process.Thalassorama 297
Use of Drawback Mechanisms
All three VAT reimbursement mechanisms (GTR, STR, and CTR) are mutually ex-
clusive on an export shipment lot basis, and exporters applying for any of them can-
not apply for either of the others. Since all three mechanisms have different calcula-
tion systems and restrictions, exporters must decide which one best fits their needs.
In this paper, the impact of different cost structures in selecting the best strategy
is analyzed. This is done under the assumption that exporters decide their strategies
based upon per-unit and financial costs.
Conditions Determining Drawback Mechanism Preference
For operational purposes, the analysis is centered on a single, homogeneous export com-
modity which is produced using national and/or imported inputs and services. This is
done in order to determine under which conditions STR, CTR, or GTR will be preferred.
A Simple Model
Preference for any of the three mechanisms depends on the relative and absolute
values of required inputs (national or imported goods/services), exported commod-
ity, proportion of imported inputs in relation to total input requirement, the VAT
rate, the drawback rate, and input import tariff rates.
Table 1
VAT Reimbursement Levels (%) for Chilean Exports Through
the STR Mechanism and Eligibility or Exclusion Conditions
Percent of Tax
Year Reimbursement Eligibility/Exclusion Conditions
1987 10% Export value of commodities less than or equal to US$7.5
million (FOB, real terms) the previous year.
5% Export value of commodities ranging from more than US$7.5
million to US$11.25 million (FOB, real terms) the previous year.
Excluded Export value of commodities greater than US$11.25 million
(FOB, real terms) the previous year.
1991 10% Export value of commodities less than or equal to US$10
million (FOB, real terms) the previous year.
5% Export value of commodities ranging from more than US$10
million to US$15 million (FOB, real terms) the previous year.
3% Export value of commodities ranging from more than US$15
million to US$18 million (FOB, real terms) the previous year.
Excluded Export value of commodities greater than US$18 million (FOB,
real terms) the previous year, or whose capital and/or input
import value were greater than US$10 million (CIF).
1993 Same steps as 1990 Same conditions for each step.
Excluded Same as 1991 or if import value (CIF) of required capital and
inputs is greater than or equal to 85% of the export value (FOB).
Source: Decree Laws No. 18,653 (1987), No. 19,024 (1990) and No. 19,270 (1993). Ministry of Eco-
nomics, various years.Letelier and González 298
The main variables to be considered are the FOB value of exports (FOBV) and
the VAT reimbursement value, according to the GTR, STR, and CTR mechanisms.
The functional relationships for these variables may be expressed as follows:
FOBV = [(RMn + Sn) + (RMi + Si) · (1 + t)] · (1 + VAT)  + VA  (1)
where FOBV = FOB value of export (US$); n = national items; i = imported items;
RMn = total cost of national raw materials, intermediate goods, and parts incorpo-
rated in producing the export commodity (US$); Sn = total cost of national services
incorporated in producing the export commodity (US$); RMi = total cost of imported
raw materials, intermediate goods, and parts incorporated in producing the export
commodity (US$); Si = total cost of imported services incorporated in producing the
export commodity (US$); VAT = the value-added tax rate (%). The VAT value in
Chile is 18%; T = input import tariff rate (%). The “t” value in Chile is 11%; and VA
= Value added before reimbursement (US$), including wages and salaries, recovery
of fixed assets, depreciation, and profits.
GTR = [(RMn + Sn) + (RMi + Si) · (1 + t)] · VAT  (2)
where GTR = value of the general VAT reimbursement (US$). All other variables,
constants, and coefficients are as previously defined. Also notice that (RMn + Sn)
represents the national intermediate consumption required to produce the export
commodity, and (RMi + Si) represents the imported intermediate consumption.
The STR mechanism is based upon the reimbursement of VAT, calculated as a
percentage of FOB value of the export commodity, and it may be expressed as:
STR = FOBV · s  (3)
where STR = value of the simplified VAT Reimbursement (US$); and S = value of
the reimbursement rate (%). The “s” value in Chile may be 10%, 5%, or 3%, de-
pending on into which category the export commodity falls. All other variables, con-
stants, and coefficients are as previously defined.
The CTR mechanism is based upon the reimbursement of tariff and VAT, and it
is calculated as:
CTR = RMi · (1 + t) · VAT + RMi · t  (4)
where CTR = value of the customs VAT reimbursement (US$). All other variables,
constants, and coefficients are as previously defined.
Let us now analyze when each of these special mechanisms may be preferred.
Preferring STR over GTR
Whenever adopting the STR mechanism yields higher reimbursement values (US$) than
the GTR mechanism, the former is preferred. Notice that the value difference between
them depends upon: (i) the proportion of imported inputs with respect to total required
inputs for producing the export commodity; (ii) the relative magnitude of the CIF value
(US$) of imported inputs with respect to total FOB value (US$) of the exported com-
modity; and (iii) the values assigned to VAT, “t,” and “s.” Thus, a higher value yielded
by STR over GTR is mathematically expressed as STR > GTR and is specified as:
FOBV · s > [(RMn + Sn) + (RMi + Si) · (1 + t)] · VAT  (5)Thalassorama 299
Rearranging terms, we get:
s/VAT > [(RMn + Sn) + (RMi + Si) · (1 + t)]/FOBV (6)
Assuming that no imported inputs are used in producing the export commodity
and evaluating “s” at a 10%, the left-hand side of equation (6) yields a coefficient of
0.556. If, however, it is assumed that only imported inputs are used in producing the
export commodity, the left-hand side of equation (6) yields a coefficient of 0.495.
This indicates that an exporter will prefer STR over GTR whenever the value of to-
tal required inputs is smaller than 49.5%, or 55.6% of the total FOB value of the ex-
ported commodity.
When evaluating “s” at 5%, the limit of the relationship between inputs and ex-
port values changes to a range of 25.2% to 27.7% for STR to be preferred over
GTR. With “s” at 3%, the limit decreases to a range of 15% to 16.7%
Preferring CTR over GTR
Similarly, the CTR mechanism will be preferred whenever it yields higher reim-
bursement values (US$) than the GTR mechanism. A higher value yielded by CTR
over GTR is mathematically expressed as CTR > GTR, and it may be specified as:
RMi · (1 + t) · VAT + RMi · t > (RMn + Sn) · VAT + (RMi + Si) · (1 + t) · VAT  (7)
When rearranging terms, it may be expressed as:
t/VAT > [(RMn + Sn) + Si(1 + t)]/RMi (8)
Assuming that no imported services are used in producing the export commod-
ity, and evaluating “t” at 11% value and VAT at 18%, the left-hand side of equation
(8) yields a coefficient of 0.611. This means that an exporter will prefer CTR over
GTR whenever the national intermediate consumption is smaller than 61.1% of the
CIF value of imported raw materials and intermediate goods and parts, before tax.
Preferring STR to CTR
Again, whenever adopting the STR mechanism yields higher reimbursement values
(US$) than the CTR mechanism, the former is preferred. A higher value yield by
CTR over GTR is mathematically expressed as STR > CTR and may be specified as:
FOBV · s > RMi · (1 + t) · VAT + RMi · t  (9)
Rearranging terms yields:
s/[(1 + t) · VAT + t] > RMi/FOBV (10)
Thus, evaluating “s” at 10% yields a coefficient of 0.323 for the left-hand side
of equation (10). This means that STR will preferred over CTR whenever the CIF
value of imported raw materials and intermediate goods and parts is smaller than
32.3% of the export commodity FOB value. If “s” is evaluated at 5%, STR will be
preferred whenever CIF value is less than 16.1% of FOB value, and, if “s” is evalu-
ated at 3%, the preference limit falls to 9.7%.Letelier and González 300
Do Special Drawback Mechanisms Constitute Implicit Subsidies?
Under the principle of avoiding the “export” of indirect taxes, the use of STR or
CTR mechanisms should yield the same results as applying the GTR mechanism. This
may not be the case in Chile, since, as the previous analysis showed, preference for STR
or CTR over GTR may not only be based on savings related to lower transaction costs
and higher availability of short-run financial resources, but also on larger amounts of re-
imbursed taxes. Thus, it is may possible to identify the existence of a potential overpay-
ment or “implicit subsidy” in using STR or CTR instead of the GTR mechanism.
Although theoretically this may be true, in practical terms, its relevance as a
subsidy will depend upon the relative weight the over-reimbursement may reach
with respect to net revenue.
Drawbacks in the Chilean Salmon Industry
Information and Procedure
Information related to actual VAT paid by producers and exporters, as well as infor-
mation on the actual value of reimbursement, is confidential in Chile, and the Chil-
ean Internal Revenue Service does not publish these statistics. Consequently, this
work is based on a gross estimation of the VAT paid and reimbursed by the Chilean
salmon industry in the Xth Region of Chile.
Estimation of VAT paid and probable reimbursements is made for the period
1990 through 1996 and is based on the analysis of the intermediate consumption
structure in the processing sector. Intermediate consumption structure is obtained
from the seafood processing sector (CIIU No. 3114), reported in the Yearly National
Industry Survey [Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA)] produced by the Chil-
ean National Institute of Statistics (INE 1990–95).
The ENIA contains information that was collected at the industrial processing
firm level. For the salmon industry, the ENIA includes information on facilities where
only salmon and trout are processed. Even though trout and salmon farms are not sepa-
rately included in ENIA’s information, farm production costs are included in the item la-
beled “Costs of Raw Material; Intermediate Goods and Parts Purchased and Received in
Processing Facilities; and Third Party Services.” Therefore, in order to properly account
for farm-level costs, it was necessary to break down the information on salmon and
trout farm production as purchase or transference at cost value, among others.
To break down salmon farming costs, a cost structure reported by Foster (1995)
for the Chilean salmon industry is used. This cost structure refers to farmed Atlantic
salmon, exported as a fresh-refrigerated, gutted, head-on (HG) product.
Both types of information are used to specify a cost structure for the Chilean
salmon industry, from the farm to export levels, as a weighted average of the
industry’s most relevant export commodities for the period analyzed. These export
commodities include: HG frozen salmon and trout (65% of total volume), fresh-re-
frigerated Atlantic salmon (26% of total volume), and a variety of related products,
such as frozen fillets and salted, smoked, and canned products (8% of total volume).
Table 2 shows the evolution of export volume (tons) for the Chilean salmon industry
at the national level during 1990 through 1996. During this period, there was an av-
erage, annual change in total exports of approximately 33%. The related median for
these changes in annual export volume is approximately 31%, indicating low vari-
ability and an increase in annual export volume at decreasing rates.
Table 3 shows the export value (thousand US$, FOB) of Chilean salmon at na-
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Source: Central Bank of Chile, 1990–96.Letelier and González 302
1996. During this period, there was an average, annual change of approximately
30% in FOB value of global exports (i.e., total exports). The related median for
these changes in annual export values is approximately 28.5%, also showing a low
variability in annual values and an increase in export value at decreasing rates.
Imported items included in intermediate consumption of this industry are vac-
cines, medications, and salmon eggs. An analysis of import statistics shows that, as
a whole, these inputs do not represent more than 2% of the industry’s FOB export
value in 1995.
On one hand, active components of vaccines and medications used in this indus-
try are imported, but they are purchased predominantly on the national market.
Therefore, for our purposes, they are considered national inputs.
On the other hand, analysis of fifty-three firms in the Chilean salmon industry
in the Xth region during 1995 (representing approximately 90% of the industry’s to-
tal export value), showed the existence of vertical integration between farming, pro-
cessing, and marketing activities. In fact, 83% of the sampled firms were vertically inte-
grated between farming and processing activities. These vertically integrated firms rep-
resent approximately 90% of the sample’s export value. In turn, 64% of the sample
firms were vertically integrated in processing and marketing activities, representing
approximately 75% of the sampled export value. The above, along with the fact that
Decree Law No. 18.480 establishes that the subject for reimbursement is the ex-
porter, leads us to consider salmon eggs as an imported raw material, even though
smolts are still considered national inputs (Ministry of Economics, 1985–96).
Table 4 shows STR rates for the period 1990 through 1996, which are used to
estimate VAT reimbursements presented in table 5. Modifications instituted in 1990
implied an increase in the level of reimbursement available to the Chilean salmon
industry. Nonetheless, the rapid growth of Chilean salmon exports simultaneously
implied the exclusion of relevant industry commodities from STR benefits.
The brief review presented above leads to three main findings: (i) the main im-
ported inputs represent less than 2% of export value, indicating that CTR may not be
an attractive reimbursement mechanism; (ii) even though eligibility requirements to
use STR and CTR require the clear distinction of export products and/or product
lines for each shipment lot, available official statistics (cost structures at farm, pro-
cessing, and marketing levels) only allows for the calculation of general average ag-
gregated industry figures; and (iii) given the fact that STR was created as a mecha-
nism to induce development of nontraditional export goods and services, the low
variability and increasing tendency (at decreasing rates) in export volume and value,
may be a sign that the industry should decrease its interest in this reimbursement
mechanism.
Finally, based on the first and second findings, the CTR mechanism is not ana-
lyzed further in this paper. Also, a formal analysis of the potential subsidiary role
played by STR would require calculating reimbursements obtained by the industry
(from both STR and GTR mechanisms) on a product-by-product basis; calculating
the positive difference (US$) generated from using STR instead of GTR, and;
weighting the importance of this difference in relation to net revenue (after tax reim-
bursement) generated by the industry. However, the second finding implies that it is
only possible to perform average, aggregated industry reimbursement calculations
based on an average cost structure. Therefore, estimates of STR are only rough,
based on the relative importance of total intermediate consumption of products (na-
tional or imported). Therefore, any estimate of reimbursement differences generated
from STR with respect to GTR will be inaccurate. At this time, it is best to analyze
the gross, average importance of STR with respect to GTR and its evolution during
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Article 420 of Law No. 18.768 established January 10, 1990, the replacement of 
Armonized Brussels Catalogue used by the Chilean Custom Service, for that of the
International 
Agreement on the 
Armonized System of Commodity Designation and Encoding.
1  Publication numbers and dates of Supreme Decrees from the Chilean Ministry of Economy establishing total or partial exclusion 
from STR benefits are: No. 208, July 16, 1990;
No. 102, May 1
1, 1991; No. 166, May 23, 1992; No. 131, 
April 19, 1993; No. 97, 
April 20, 1994; No. 130, 
April 27, 1995; No. 109, May 7, 1996; and No. 123, May 12, 1997.
2
 Law No. 19.024, published on December 31, 1990, changed the base year and increased the reference export volume for export exc
lusion from the STR. 
Additionally
,
this law established a 3%, 5%, and 10% reimbursement step system.Thalassorama 305
VAT Reimbursement Estimates Under STR
The estimate of VAT reimbursement for the period 1990 through 1996 when apply-
ing STR, yields a probable, annual average industry reimbursement of approxi-
mately US$3.5 million.
Table 5 shows the maximum amount of annual reimbursement (thousands of
US$) the industry could have applied for during the period 1990 through 1996.
Comparison of these results with export values and volumes reveals that only 14%
of the industry (in value) was eligible to use the STR mechanism and that only
10.3% of the industry (in volume) was eligible to use it (tables 2 and 3).
Table 5 also shows that the most relevant export commodities for STR use are,
in order of importance: frozen trout fillets (0304.20.60); frozen salmon fillets
(0304.20.50); fresh-refrigerated salmon meats (0304.10.50); frozen Atlantic and
Danube salmon (0303.22.00); and smoked Pacific and Atlantic salmon (0305.41.00),
representing 66% of the total reimbursed value during the period analyzed. These
products represent only 23% of the total and average export value during 1990
through 1996. On the other hand, the industry’s most important and traditional prod-
ucts, frozen Pacific salmon (0303.10.00), fresh-refrigerated Pacific, Atlantic, and
Danube salmon (0302.12.00); and frozen trout (0303.21.00), representing 74% of in-
dustry export value during 1990 through 1996, accounted for only 10% of the esti-
mated STR. Furthermore, of these products, only frozen trout was eligible for STR
reimbursement.
Results also show that, even though annual changes in the total reimbursement
amount have a high variability, on average, there has been an increasing tendency in
the probable STR annually requested. This is reflected by an average increase of ap-
proximately 22% in annual, probable requested STR (table 5). Products with a
higher contribution to this increase in requested STR are: other frozen trout meats
(0304.90.60), frozen trout fillets (0304.20.20), fresh-refrigerated trout fillets and
other meats (0304.10.60), and other frozen salmon meats (0304.90.50).
Notice that products with a higher contribution to estimated annual STR reim-
bursement have a per-unit weighted average gross value of 6.11 US$/kg and, that
products with a higher contribution to STR increase have a per-unit gross value of
7.56 US$/kg. Also, the industry’s most important and traditional products have a
lower per-unit weighted average gross value, $4.49/kg. These results indicate that
nontraditional, higher-valued products (presumably with a high degree of value
added) are those involved in STR use.
Table 6 shows the relative importance (percentage) of total intermediate con-
sumption (national and imported) vis-à-vis the gross value of production, evaluated
at “s” = 10% for the period 1990 through 1996. Results show that for 1992 and
1993, the STR mechanism should be preferred over GTR, since in those years, inter-
mediate consumption represented less than 55.6% of total export value. For all other
years in the period (1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, and 1996), the relative importance
(percentage) of intermediate consumption was greater than 55.6% of FOB export
value and, therefore, GTR was preferred over STR. An analysis of the average dif-
ference between the relative importance (percentage) of intermediate consumption
and the decision limit (i.e., 55.6%) shows that this is 1.1% for the period 1990
through 1996. This implies that, although exporters should use GTR, the marginal
difference makes them indifferent. Therefore, actual use of STR should be based
mostly on the grounds of its incentive nature to develop nontraditional export
growth through lower transaction and/or financial costs, and not on additional reim-
bursement grounds (subsidies).
Table 7 shows the industry’s gross revenue and cost structures, value-added net
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Table 6
Relative Importance (percentage) of Intermediate Consumption
With Respect to FOB Gross Value of Production, 1990–96
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996








Percentage 60.68 56.73 50.19 51.93 57.37 58.21 58.21
Note: Proportion of intermediate consumption is evaluated at s = 10%.
tax reimbursement, for the period 1990–96. The structure of table 7 does not imply
that exporters may simultaneously apply for both the GTR and STR mechanisms on
a particular shipment lot at a given point in time. It only reflects the potential weight
or proportion, at the industry level, that both reimbursement mechanisms may have
on industry revenues.
Although STR estimates show that probable reimbursement requests have in-
creased in nominal terms, their relative importance has declined from 20% of total
reimbursement (STR plus GTR) in 1991, to only a 6% in 1996. It also shows that
the relative importance of STR with respect to the industry’s net revenue (after tax
reimbursement) may have declined from approximately 9% in 1991, to only 2.7% in
1996. These results show a tendency for an increasingly lower incidence of probable
STR requested on the industry’s net revenues.
Table 7 also shows that the relative importance of probable GTR requested has
increased from 80% in 1991, to 94% in 1996. The incidence of GTR on the
industry’s net revenues, however, has not increased. In fact, after experiencing a ten-
dency to decrease from 47% (1990) to 18% (1992), it recovered its original relative
importance in 1996 (44%).
In summary, in spite of the nominal increase in both total and STR reimburse-
ment during the period analyzed, the relative importance of the later has clearly de-
creased. This may be an indication that this mechanism is not that attractive as an
additional source of income, but as an incentive to facilitate the development of
nontraditional products.
Conclusions
Regarding our objective to determine whether special drawback mechanisms used in
Chile play a subsidiary role or not, findings regarding the Chilean salmon industry
seem to indicate that this would not be the case—at least when comparing and ana-
lyzing weighted average results at industry level (tables 5, 6, and 7).
First, the relatively low importance of the industry’s imported inputs (vaccines,
medications, and salmon eggs), especially when considering that some of them (vac-
cines and medications) may actually be considered national inputs, led us to dismiss
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Source: INE and Fisheries Statistics (SERNAPESCA).
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ference in intermediate consumption presented here and in table 6 arises only on an accounting basis. In fact, cost of
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) at the farm level. Nonetheless, estimates on net revenues before tax reimbursement are
not af
fected by this breakdown.
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These figures are lower than the ones presented in table 5 because they represent reimbursements for the salmon industry locat
ed in the Xth region—not at the national level.Thalassorama 309
Second, the industry’s importance of intermediate consumption with respect to
gross revenue (table 6) indicates a marginal preference for the use of the GTR
mechanism instead of STR. In turn, table 5 shows that although probable STR re-
quested is increasing in nominal terms, this increase is mostly represented by non-
traditional products. Thus, results from tables 5 and 6 seem to indicate the industry’s
use of STR as an incentive to increase growth in the export of nontraditional prod-
ucts, rather than to gain additional income (subsidiary role). Table 7 also shows that
the relative importance of STR with respect to net revenues (after tax reimburse-
ment) is decreasing. This may be explained by the fact that as the industry reaches
maturity, the bulk of its export value is made up of the three most traditional prod-
ucts, which have a very low incidence of STR reimbursement (only 10%). Thus, al-
though nontraditional exports are increasing in terms of volume and total value,
their relative importance is decreasing. On the other hand, as the export of nontradi-
tional products increases in total value, they may no longer be eligible for the STR
mechanism. Therefore, this also indicates that the salmon industry may not be using
STR on subsidiary grounds.
Finally, it is necessary to stress that results reported herein are a first approxi-
mation to this issue. Given the weighted average characteristics of official statistics
on actual industry VAT reimbursement, as well as the industry’s actual cost structure
for different products, it may necessary to conduct future analysis on a product-by-
product basis in order to determine whether or not special drawback mechanisms
may or may not have a subsidiary role on certain products.
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